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BANKRUPTCY JUDGES AND THE
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY*
DAVID P. CURRIE**

Among the powers conferred upon Congress by article I of the
United States Constitution is the authority to "establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies,"' and ever since 1898
there has been a federal bankruptcy law authorizing federal tribunals on petition either of a distressed debtor or of his creditors to
2
distribute his assets and to discharge him from further liability.
Since the bankruptcy law is federal, bankruptcy cases are
"Cases ... arising under ... the Laws of the United States" and
therefore fall within the "judicial Power of the United States" as
defined by article III. This judicial power, the same article
prescribes, is to be vested in courts whose judges "hold their Offices during good Behavior" and "receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
'3
in Office."
Until very recently, exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy
4
cases was vested by statute in the United States District Courts,
whose judges are appointed under article III and satisfy its requirements of tenure and irreducible compensation. 5 Pursuant to
Congressional authorization, however, the district courts appointed bankruptcy referees-later called bankruptcy judges-to
whom they voluntarily referred bankruptcy cases for initial decision subject to their own review. 6 The authority and self-sufficiency of the bankruptcy referees were extended gradually over
the years, most notably by the Supreme Court's 1973 Bankruptcy
Rules; but the constitutionality of this arrangement was never
determined.
In 1978 Congress scrapped the entire referee system, requiring
that "all of the jurisdiction conferred . . .on the district courts"
* This article was prepared in connection with the Dean Louis J. TePoel
Lecture delivered by Professor Currie at the Creighton University School of Law on
March 4, 1982.
** Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A., University of
Chicago, 1957; LL.B., Harvard University, 1960.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 61, 30 Stat. 544, 544-66 (1898).
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976).

5. Id. at § 134(a).
6. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text infra.
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with respect to bankruptcy be exercised by a new "bankruptcy
court ' 7 whose judges were to be appointed by the President and

Senate "for a term of 14 years. '8 The bankruptcy court was to
have, with two minor exceptions, all "the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty,"9 including the power to enforce its judgments by writs of execution and by civil contempt orders; and the
jurisdiction was extended to "all civil proceedings ...

arising or

related to" bankruptcy cases 0-including ordinary tort and contract actions against debtors of the bankrupt. Review by the district court, by a panel of bankruptcy judges, or by a court of
appeals was to be available, but the context makes clear that this
review was to be appellate, not de novo.1 2 In other words, Congress had entrusted the trial and decision of all civil controversies
affecting a bankrupt to a set of judges enjoying neither life tenure
nor irreducible salary.
In 1980 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. filed a reorganiza7. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (Supp. III 1979).
8. Id. at § 153(a). Their salary was to be $50,000 per year subject to the same
adjustment formulas that apply to district judges. Id. at §§ 154, 135. Unlike district
judges, they were to be removable by the judicial council of their circuit for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability." Id. at
§ 153(b). The new provisions were to take full effect only in 1984, but during the
transition period substantially similar powers were to be exercised by the existing
bankruptcy judges (formerly trustees in bankruptcy), who likewise lacked article
III tenure. See Pub. L. 95-598 [Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978], §§ 405, 409, 92 Stat.
2549, 2685, 2687 (1978) (not codified), note preceding 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. 1111979)
(Jurisdiction and Procedure During Transition; Transition to New Court System);
see also 11 U.S.C. § 62 (1976) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. I1 1979).
10. Id. at § 1471(b).
11. Id. at §§ 1293, 1334, 1482.
12. The statutory language itself refutes any suggestion that Congress meant
to subject the decisions to bankruptcy judges to de novo reexamination by article
III judges; the term "appeal" suggests the normal appellate practice of limited fact
review. This inference is unmistakably confirmed by the legislative history. The
expressly declared purpose of the statute was "to eliminate both the real and apparent dependency and subservience of the bankruptcy court" and to create a
"functionally independent" bankruptcy court, S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 5802; this purpose would be defeated by de novo review. There is no need, however, to rely on implication, for the
Senate Report explicitly stated that "the district court will function only as an appellate judge in bankruptcy matters ... " Id. at 154, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5940.
Thus the statute assimilates the position of the district court on appeal from a
bankruptcy judge to that of a court of appeals reviewing a district court; and in that
situation the trial judge's findings of fact must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. FED. R Civ. P. 52(a). Indeed the 1978 Act specifically continued in effect the
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Rules, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598,
§ 405(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2685 (1978); and Rule 801 imposes the clearly-erroneous standard for review of bankruptcy judges themselves, FED. R. BANKR.P. 801.
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tion petition under the bankruptcy laws in the District Court for
the District of Minnesota. Northern then filed a claim against Marathon Pipe Line Co. in the reorganization proceeding, seeking
damages for breach of contract and related wrongs. Over three
dissents, the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline ConstructionCo.
v. MarathonPipe Line Co. held the provision for decision of Northern's claim by a nontenured bankruptcy judge was contrary to artiis
cle IH.
Having participated in the drafting of an amicus brief arguing
that the bankruptcy-judge provisions were unconstitutional, I cannot pretend to be an impartial observer. Nevertheless, the importance of the underlying principle leads me to explain why I think
the Court was right.

I
If one consults the text of article III, the provision for bankruptcy judges looks flatly unconstitutional. Northern's claim was a
"Controvers [y] . . .between Citizens of different States ...;,,14
arguably it was so related to the bankruptcy petition as to be also
part of a case arising under federal law. In either case it fell within
the federal judicial power and must therefore be decided by a
judge with tenure and protected salary.
This conclusion is just as clearly confirmed by the purpose of
the tenure and salary provisions. "That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the constitution and of individuals, which
we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice," wrote
Hamilton in explaining these provisions, "can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission."'15 Moreover, he added, "[n]ext to permanency in office,
nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges,
than a fixed provision of their support."'1 6 Hamilton went on to say
why this was so: "If the power of making (periodic appointments]
was committed either to the executive or legislative, there would
be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which pos13. 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). The bankruptcy judge had upheld his own jurisdiction. In re Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 6 Bankr. 928, 931 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
The district court reversed. Marathon Pipe Line Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co., 12 Bankr. 946, 947 (D. Minn. 1981). A bankruptcy judge in Tennessee later
reached the same conclusion as the district court in Marathon. In re Rivers, 19
Bankr. 438, 454 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). A judge in Puerto Rico decided to the
contrary. In re Segarra, 24 Bankr. 870, 873 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1981).
14. U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 2, cl. 1.
15.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 581 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1880).

16. Id. No. 79, at 583.
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and "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to

a power over his will.'

8

The Justices of the Supreme Court, who

owe their independence to the tenure and salary provisions of article III, have recognized this purpose from the beginning, 19 and so
have the commentators. 20 No Justice argued otherwise in Northern
Pipeline.
As Justice White conceded in dissent, if the Court was to rethe provision for
spect the words and purpose of the Constitution,
21
nontenured bankruptcy judges was invalid.
17. Id. No. 78, at 581.
18. Id. No. 79, at 583.
19. As early as 1792, sitting on circuit, Justices Wilson and Blair refused to
carry out an Act of Congress because its provision subjecting court decisions to
executive revision was "radically inconsistent with the independence of th[e] judicial power. . .," which in their view it was the function of the tenure and salary
provisions to assure. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 n.(a) (C.C.D. Pa.
1792). In O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933), quoting from the Declaration of Independence and from Hamilton, the Court reaffirmed that "the power to
diminish the compensation of the federal judges was explicitly denied, in order,
inter alia, that their judgment or action might never be swayed in the slightest
degree by the temptation to cultivate the favor or avoid the displeasure of that department which, as master of the purse, would otherwise hold the power to reduce
their means of support." Id. at 531. In Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1956), speaking
for the Court, Justice Black wrote that "[t)he provisions of Article III were
designed to give judges maximum freedom from possible coercion or influence by
the executive or legislative branches of the Government." Id. at 16. In United
States v. Will, 101 S. Ct. 471 (1980), the Chief Justice reviewed for the Court the
history and purposes of the tenure and compensation provisions as sketched above
and declared:
The Compensation Clause has its roots in the long-standing Anglo-American tradition of an independent judiciary. A judiciary free from control by
the Executive and the Legislature is essential if there is a right to have
claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by other
branches of government.
Id. at 482. "Our Constitution," the Chief Justice added, "promotes that independence specifically by providing" for tenure and irreducible salary. Id.
20. See, e.g., 1 TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE App. 268 (1803), condemning the former
British practice of appointing temporary judges dependent on the King for their
security ("[W]hilst the frailties of human nature remain, can such a tribunal be
deemed impartial?") and declaring that "most wisely was it provided [in our ConstitutionJ that the judges of those courts ... should depend only on their good behavior for their continuance in office, and be placed at once beyond the reach of
hope or fear, where they might hold the balance of justice steadily in their hands."

Id. See also 3 J. STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

457-97 (1833). "Can it be supposed for a moment, that men holding their offices for
the short period of two, or four, or even six years, will be generally found firm
eriough to resist the will of those who appoint them, and may remove them?... To
have made the judges ... removable at the pleasure of the president and Congress
...would have been placing the keys of the citadel in the possession of those
against whose assaults the people were most strenuously endeavoring to guard
themselves." Id. at 426-27, 436.
21. 102 S. Ct. at 2882-83.
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In my opinion, independent judges are a good institution; our
unfortunate experience with arbiters subject to royal control during the colonial period 22 confirms the intuitive force of Hamilton's
theory. Respect for the rule of law leads me to the further conclusion that constitutional provisions ought to be adhered to even if
they are misguided: The price paid in the long run for ignoring the
law, as Washington reminded us, seems likely to outweigh the immediate gain.23 Justice White did not argue that the tenure and
salary provisions were misguided. His position was that it was
"too late to return to the simplicity of the principle pronounced in
Article III and defended so vigorously and persuasively by Hamilton.. ;,,24it was too late to do what the Constitution required.
Justice White, that is to say, invoked precedent. Even square
authority, of course, can be overruled if it conflicts plainly enough
with important constitutional principles, as the Court so graphically demonstrated in the racial-segregation cases. 25 Nevertheless

precedent too has strong claims; predictability requires some assurance that settled propositions not come unglued every time a
new Justice disagrees with them. If, therefore, the Court in previous decisions had essentially read the tenure and salary provisions
out of the Constitution, it might arguably have been, as the dissenters contended, "too late" to put them back in. In my opinion,
though the Court had rendered a number of highly questionable
decisions impairing the protections afforded by article Ill, it had
never upheld anything comparable in terms of its own opinions to
the provisions for bankruptcy judges; and reluctance to overrule
precedent does not require that bad decisions be extended to a situation distinguishable on the basis of their own reasoning.
HI
In the first place, the Court has by no means consistently allowed Congress to ignore the salary and tenure provisions; in fact
it has repeatedly enforced them. When President Lincoln subjected civilians to trial by military commissions during the Civil
War, the Court held that wartime necessity was no justification:
22. One of the grounds for complaint against George III in the Declaration of
Independence was that he had "made judges dependent on his will alone for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." The Declaration of Independence para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
23. G. WASHiNGTON, First Inaugural Address & Farewell Address, reprinted in
AN AMERICAN PRIMER 173, 194 (D. Boorstin ed. 1966).

24. 102 S. Ct. at 2893.
25.

See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed during
good Behaviour. '26 When Congress attempted to reduce the salaries of judges of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia during the Depression, the Court found
our most severe economic crisis an insufficient excuse: "[Tihe
judges of these courts hold their offices during good Behaviour,
and ... their compensation cannot, under the Constitution, be diminished during their continuance in office. ' 27 When litigants
complained that judges of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals could not constitutionally be assigned to hear cases in article
III courts, the Court rejected the argument only after concluding
that those judges enjoyed tenure and irreducible salary, and Justice Harlan wrote expressly that the litigants had a right to an article III judge: "Article III, § 1 ... is explicit and gives the
petitioners a basis for complaint ...."-28 Less than two years
before Northern Pipeline, moreover, the Court refused to allow
Congress to deprive federal judges of salary increases that had al29
ready gone into effect.
It is against the background of these decisions that one should
evaluate Justice White's contention that it is "too late" to pay attention to the words and purpose of article III.
IV
As early as 1820, Justice Bushrod Washington declared in
Houston v. Moore3° that article III did not forbid state courts to
determine cases within the federal judicial power.3 1 In a separate
opinion in 1932, Justice Brandeis used the availability of a state
26. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122 (1867) (alternative holding). The
Court also held that Milligan's right to jury trial had been denied. Id.
27. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 552 (1933) (Hughes, C.J., Van
Deventer & Cardozo, JJ., dissenting).
28. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533 (1962). Justice Harlan spoke only
for three Justices, but it seems clear that the entire court agreed on this point. See
note 86 and accompanying text infra.
29. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 224-26 (1980). See also Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (C.C.D.N.C. 1792), where Justice Iredell held a statute unconstitutional on the ground that it conferred judicial power on the Secretary of War.
"[F] or, though Congress may certainly establish . .. courts of appellate jurisdiction, yet such courts must consist of judges appointed in the manner the Constitution requires, and holding their offices by no other tenure than that of their good
behaviour, by which tenure the office of Secretary of War is not held." Id. at 413 n.4.
30. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 1 (1820).
31. Id. at 25-27. It is not clear that Washington spoke for a majority of the
Court, but the principle he enunciated has endured. See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 (1962); THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton).
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forum as an argument that article III cases could be entrusted to
nontenured federal officials as well: "[n] othing [in article II] ..
requires any controversy to be determined as of first instance in
'32
the federal district courts.
The analogy is unconvincing. In the first place, there are plausible justifications for allowing state judges to decide article III
cases while insisting that federal judges have tenure. On the one
hand, state-court jurisdiction is supported by countervailing considerations of federalism that are absent in the case of federal
judges; on the other, whatever the institutional weaknesses of
state-court judges, they can hardly be thought to be unduly dependent upon either Congress or the President, whose influence the
tenure and salary provisions were principally designed to prevent.33 Even if there were no persuasive reason for the distinction,
the more fundamental objection would remain: Notwithstanding
the fact that state courts may decide article III cases, the Constitution is quite clear that federal judges must hold office during good
behavior.
V
In American Insurance Co. v. Canter34 and in Palmore v.
United States35 the Court held that cases within article III could be
entrusted to courts not meeting the requisites of article M in the
Territories and in the District of Columbia. Whether right or
wrong, neither decision supports the constitutionality of nontenured bankruptcy courts in Minnesota; for both were expressly
based upon the peculiar status of the District and of the
Territories.
Chief Justice Marshall was quite explicit in Canter in limiting
his conclusion to the territories:
32. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
White echoed the suggestion in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973):
"[B]oth Congress and th[is] Court have recognized that state courts are appropriate forums in which federal questions and federal crimes may at times be tried
.. "
Id. at 407. He retreated from the full implication of the argument in Northern
Pipeline: ".I
do not suggest that the analogy means that Congress may establish an
Article I court whenever it could have chosen to rely upon the state courts." 102 S.
Ct. at 2894-95.
33. See United States v. Raddatz, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 2428 n.6 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); 102 S. Ct. at 2867-68 n.15; Krattenmaker, Article III and JudicialIndependence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional,70 GEO. LJ.297
(1981): "Because untenured state court judges are not appointed, confirmed, paid

or removed by Congress, no separation of powers principle is violated by permitting
Congress to leave application of its statutes to these judges." Id. at 304.
34. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
35. 411 U.S. 389, 403, 410 (1973).
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Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in
the states in those Courts, only, which are established in
pursuance of the 3d article of the Constitution; the same
limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating
for them, Congress exercises the combined
powers of the
36
general, and of a state government.
Far from supporting Justice White's position, Canter argues
squarely against the creation of nontenured bankruptcy judges, or
of any other nontenured federal judges, within the states. In fact
the bankruptcy statute did precisely what Canter said could not be
done: It empowered nontenured judges to exercise "admiralty jurisdiction ... in the states . ... 1,37
Similarly, in Palmore, invoking the territorial analogy and
stressing that in the District of Columbia as well "Congress may
S..

exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state leg-

islature or municipal government would have in legislating for
state or local purposes, ' 38 Justice White observed that both the
court and the law under which the defendant was tried were entirely local and analogized the District of Columbia to a state:
"Palmore was no more disadvantaged and no more entitled to an
Art. III judge than any other citizen of any of the 50 States who is
tried for a strictly local crime. '39 Moreover, the Court echoed Marshall in declaring that Canter had allowed territorial courts to hear
cases "that ordinarily could be heard only by Art. III judges;" 4 and
it added that the power of Congress over the District of Columbia
"permits it to legislate for the District ... with respect to subjects
that would exceed its powers.

. .

in the context of national legisla-

tion enacted under other powers ....
Thus the thrust of Palmore was that the District of Columbia, like the Territories, was
outside the normal limits of article III because of its special status;
Palmore, like Canter, is no authority for the creation of nontenured federal judges within the States. 42
"-41

36. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. III 1979). United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 80 (1894),
sustained a territorial court on the authority of Canter. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464
(1891), involved a consular court outside the United States and was based in part on
the Court's conclusion that the Constitution was inapplicable abroad.
38. 411 U.S. at 397.
39. Id. at 410.
40. Id. at 403.
41. Id. at 398.
42. Justice White, wrenching out of context his remark that article III tribunals
are unnecessary in "specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting
distinctive treatment," 411 U.S. at 408, would find in Palmore support for a broader
use of legislative courts than was at stake in Palmore itself. 102 S. Ct. at 2894. What
the Court actually said was "that the requirements of Art. III, which are applicable
where laws of national applicabilityand affairs of national concern are at stake,
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Ever since the beginning, soldiers and sailors have been tried
by ad hoc courts-martial for service-related offenses, even though
the governing law was federal.4 3 This scheme was upheld in dictum in Dynes v. Hoover44 in 1858: "Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences in
the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations;... the

power to do so is given without any connection between it and the
3d article of the Constitution . ..-45 The Court reaffirmed this
conclusion as recently as 1971.46 Yet the quotation from Dynes it-

self suggests that the court-martial exception is based upon the
historically special and separate position of military justice; a similar dictum in Ex parte Milligan47 also recognizing the military exception implied that it may be derived (however debatably) from
the fifth amendment's provision that grand juries are not required
in certain military cases;48 and later decisions including Milligan
itself have shown the limited nature of the military exception by
holding the court-martial of civilians 49-and even sometimes of
servicemen 5 0-to be unconstitutional. 5 1 Thus the military cases
are sui generis; they do not5 2support the creation of nontenured
judges for bankruptcy cases.

must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to
Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs
and warranting distinctive treatment." 411 U.S. at 407-08 (emphasis added). The
contrast with "laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern" and the
preceding discussion of territorial courts strongly suggest, as the issue presented
dictated, that the "areas" of which the Court spoke were geographical ones.
43. The present statutes are found in 10 U.S.C. ch. 47 (1976). See also Note,
Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J. 380, 380-86 (1966).
44. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
45. Id. at 79.
46. Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 362-63 (1971).
47. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867).
48. Id. at 123: "IT]he framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the
right of trial by jury, in the sixth amendment, to those persons who were subject to
indictment or presentment in the fifth." Id.
49. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1957).
50. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 274 (1969).
51. In these later cases the Court once again stressed the tenure and salary
provisions as guarantees of judicial independence, holding that the military powers
granted Congress by article I should not be construed to authorize military trials
under the circumstances in order not to impair the rights of an independent tribunal and of a trial by jury. See, e.g., Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955): 'The provisions of Article HI were designed to give judges maximum freedom from possible
coercion or influence by the executive or legislative branches of the Government
.... [T] he Constitution does not provide life tenure of those performing judicial
functions in military trials." Id. at 16-17.
52. See also 102 S.Ct. at 2868-69.
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VII
The 1856 decision in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.53 has played a significant role in the expansion of
the categories of cases that can be entrusted to nontenured tribunals. The critical passage is as follows:
[T] here are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable
of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance54 of the courts of the United States, as
it may deem proper.
On its face this statement does not purport to say that Congress
may entrust the decision of such matters to courts whose judges
lack tenure; it says Congress may choose not to entrust them to a
court at all. The facts of the Murray case confirm this
interpretation.
The case arose out of the affairs of one Samuel Swartwout,
who was already familiar to the Supreme Court through his association with Aaron Burr's shady western adventures. 55 In 1833
Swartwout was customs collector for the port of New York, and his
account of moneys received on behalf of the Government was
$1,374,119.65 in arrears. Pursuant to statute, the Solicitor of the
Treasury issued a distress warrant, under which Swartwout's
property was sold to satisfy the debt. The validity of the distress
warrant was challenged on various grounds, one of which was that
the collection of debts was judicial matter that could be entrusted
only to article III judges. Invoking a long history of summary remedies, the Court disagreed: While debts could be collected in a judicial manner, they need not be; it was permissible to collect by
simple seizure of the debtor's property.5 6 Thus Murray's Lessee
held only that the Government could collect debts owed by its revenue officer without suing at all, not that it could sue for the debt
before judges lacking the protections of article III.
VIII
Murray's Lessee was relied on for a much more troublesome
conclusion in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.5V in 1929, which held that the
53.

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).

54. Id. at 284.
55.
VmAL,
56.
57.

See Exparte Boiman & Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). See also G.
BuRR passim (1973).
59 U.S. at 284-86.
279 U.S. 438 (1929).

HeinOnline -- 16 Creighton L. Rev. 450 1982-1983

BANKRUPTCY JUDGES

19831

Court of Customs Appeals, unlike an article III court, could give
advisory opinions because it had been established pursuant to article 1.58 Customs duties, like the debts in Murray's Lessee, could
be collected summarily;5 9 thus, the Court said, they too fell within
the class of "matters, arising between the government and others,
which from their nature do not require judicial determination and
yet are susceptible of it. ' ' 60 In such cases, wrote Justice Van Devanter, "Congress may reserve to itself the power to decide, may
delegate that power to executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals"-and it may vest it in "legislative courts" not subject to the restrictions of article ]I. 61 Murray'sLessee was cited as
authority, but Bakelite went far beyond that precedent; for while
the distraint procedure had bypassed the judicial process entirely,
Congress had created a judicial tribunal to decide customs disputes. Article III may not require that courts be used at all, but it
leaves no doubt as to how courts are to be constituted if they are
created.
Yet Bakelite contains two limiting principles that serve to distinguish it from the case of the bankruptcy judges. First, Bakelite
was expressly limited to matters "arising between the government
and others," 62 that is, to controversies to which the United States is
a party. This limitation had already been emphasized in Murray's
Lessee, on which Bakelite relied, where the Court upheld seizure
of a customs collector's property to satisfy his obligations to the
United States:
[Tihere are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable
of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance63 of the courts of the United States, as
it may deem proper.
The same distinction was invoked as recently as 1977 in the context of the seventh amendment right of trial by jury:
Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only
those situations involving 'public rights,' e.g., where the
Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an
otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights.
Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 454, 459-61.
Id. at 458.
Id.at 451.
Id.
Id.
59 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added). See also notes 52-54 and accompanying

text supra.
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as a vast range of other cases as well are not at all
implicated.6
Bankruptcy cases are not controversies "between the government and others" but rather involve essentially private litigation
between private parties. The rights involved are private, not "public;" even when the Government is one of the claimants against the
bankrupt estate, it does not necessarily appear "in its sovereign
capacity," but on the same basis as any other creditor. In contrast
to the case just quoted, which was a proceeding seeking penalties
for the violation of a federal statute, in an ordinary bankruptcy
case "[w] holly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well as
a vast range of other cases as well" are indeed implicated. As the
government conceded in its brief in Northern Pipeline,
"[b Iankruptcy proceedings primarily concern the relationship between an insolvent debtor and his creditors." 65
Second, the Court was careful in Bakelite to limit legislative
courts within the states to the decision of "matters ... [which] do
not require judicial determination, '66 and it emphasized that the
business of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals included
"nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determination, but only matters the determination of which may be, and at
'67
times has been, committed exclusively to executive officers.
This distinction makes eminent sense in terms of the purposes of
article III, for the claim of a right to a decision uninfluenced by
Congress or the Executive is obviously less compelling when those
branches could have made the decision in the first place. Thus the
basis of Bakelite was that Congress could give the customs business to a nontenured court because it could have sidestepped the
courts altogether; it follows that Bakelite does not support the cre64. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 458 (1977).
65. Brief for Appellant at 33-34, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). The Government attempted to avoid this unmistakable distinction by arguing that "bankruptcy proceedings involve the conferral of a
public benefit and implicate the public interest in a way that ordinary suits between
private litigants do not." Id. at 34. The "public benefit" to which the government
referred was" [tIhe discharge in bankruptcy of a debtor's obligations." Id. But the
effort to assimilate this "benefit" to the "public rights" involved in Bakelite, Murray, and Atlas was nothing but a play upon words. In this sense every private adjudication results in a "public benefit ... conferred by the government"-a judgment
that fixes the rights of the parties. Id. If the entry of judgment in a bankruptcy case
is enough to transform a purely private litigation into one involving "public rights,"
the Court's carefully repeated distinction is entirely without substance. The "public benefit" of a judgment is not what the Court had in mind when it equated cases
involving "public rights" with those in which "the Government is involved in its
sovereign capacity." Id.
66. 279 U.S. at 451.
67. Id. at 458.
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ation of legislative courts for any matters that could
not be dis68
posed of by purely legislative or executive action.
In concluding that customs cases were not "inherently... judicial," Bakelite expressly noted the historical practice of collecting customs by the purely executive device of "requiring duties to
be paid . . without awaiting disposal of protests ...- 69 and
stressed the fact that the "final determination" of later protests
had been "at times confided to the Secretary of the Treasury, with
no recourse to judicial proceedings. ' 70 The Court relied further on
the example of the Court of Claims, which had jurisdiction to determine claims against the United States. As the Court emphasized, Congress had long paid claimants by private bill or
delegated final authority to the executive to do so; since the government could not be sued at all without its consent, the determi71
nation of such claims could not be said to require judicial action.
Nothing of the sort can be said of private bankruptcy litigation, as
to which there is neither sovereign immunity nor a sufficient tradition of nonjudicial decision. 72 Bankruptcy cases were among those
listed by the leading contemporary comment on Bakelite as "inherently ...judicial:" "[I]t would seem that bankruptcy matters
and patent infringement suits could not be committed to legislative courts, since these matters have never been considered as susceptible of final determination by executive officers. '73 In short,
because Bakelite was expressly limited to government cases that
were not inherently judicial, it is not authority for the creation of
nontenured bankruptcy judges. 74
68. See Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARv. L. Rzv. 894 (1930): 'The
only matters which the Bakelite doctrine permits to be taken from the constitutional courts and vested in legislative courts are those which Congress could, apart
from that decision, commit to the final determination of executive officers." Id. at
916-17. See also Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). "[W]e do not consider congress can ... withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from
its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty .
Id. at 284.
69. 279 U.S. at 458.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 452-53.
72. There is a history of state legislative acts relieving individual debtors of
their obligations. See Nadelman, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 Am.J.

HIST. 215, 221-23 (1957). The power of Congress, however, is expressly limited to enacting "uniform" bankruptcy laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. In any
event, the old individual insolvency acts did not purport to resolve ordinary contract and tort actions involving the bankrupt estate, as the new bankruptcy judges
were authorized to do.
73. Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARv. L.REV. 894, 916 (1930).
74. See also 102 S. Ct. at 2869-71 (1982). Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553
(1933), held that the salary of a judge of the Court of Claims could constitutionally
be reduced during his term because, as the Court had said in dictum in Bakelite,
LEGAL
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Ix
The 1932 decision in Crowell v. Benson 75 contains statements
that go even beyond Bakelite in undercutting the requirements of
article III. The Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act had set up a federal administrative agency to determine
claims for workmen's compensation, and the district court had
construed the statute to require a trial de novo in order to avoid
holding it unconstitutional. The Supreme Court acknowledged
that Bakelite did not support the vesting of personal-injury jurisdiction in a nontenured tribunal: "[TJhe distinction is at once apparent between cases of private right and those which arise
between the Government and persons subject to its authority
the Court of Claims was a legislative court not created under article ll. Williams is
often mentioned in the same breath with Bakelite as authority for Congress' power
to create courts not subject to the restrictions of article M. But the reasoning of
Williams was at the opposite pole from that of Bakelite. For while Bakelite held
that Congress had a choice whether to vest jurisdiction over certain matters in a
constitutional or in a legislative court, Williams firmly declared to the contrary.
The argument that suits against the United States fell within article m, wrote Justice Sutherland,
cannot be reconciled with the limitation fundamentally implicit in the constitutional separation of the powers, namely, that a power definitely assigned by the Constitution to one department can neither be surrendered
nor delegated by that department, nor vested by statute in another department or agency. . .. And since Congress... undoubtedly may... confer
upon an executive officer or administrative board ... or retain for itself,
the power to hear and determine controversies respecting claims against
the United States, it follows indubitably that such power, in whatever guise
or by whatever agency exercised, is no part of the judicial power vested in
the constitutional courts by the third article.
289 U.S. at 580-81 (emphasis original). Thus Williams stands for the proposition
that powers within article III can be exercised only by tenured judges, and it calls
into question the earlier decisions in both Bakelite and Crowell, which had said
that in some cases Congress had a choice between tenured and nontenured tribunals.
Glidden v. Zdanok, which I have already discussed, see note 27 and accompanying text supra, departs from Williams' specific holding that the Court of Claims
was not an article III court, and it may reject by implication Williams' surprising
conclusion that suits against the United States are outside article m. But nothing
in Glidden purports to disturb the Williams principle that only an article III court
can exercise article III powers within the states; Justice Harlan merely "assumed"
without deciding that Congress had a choice whether to entrust the business there
in issue to either a legislative or a constitutional court. 370 U.S. at 534, 541. Indeed,
the same opinion's unequivocal acknowledgment that article III gave the parties in
federal court a right to a tenured judge makes it seem highly questionable that Justice Harlan would really have allowed the right to be circumvented by transferring
jurisdiction to an article I tribunal.
In any event, as explained at notes 84-87 and accompanying text infra, the
bankruptcy case falls on the wrong side of any distinction that might be drawn between the two situations.
75. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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Murray and Bakelite, the Court conceded, had both involved government litigation, while Crowell was a case "of private
right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the
law as defined. '77 Nevertheless, even in private cases, "there is no
requirement that.., all determinations of fact in constitutional
courts shall be made by judges. 7 8 Juries and masters traditionally
made such determinations, so it was all right for an administrative
agency to do so-because7 9the court was given power to redetermine all questions of law.
This is getting serious. In Crowell the Court flatly said that
even in cases that did not meet the Murray standard--even in
those inherently judicial-it was acceptable to commit the determination of facts to nontenured officials so long as article III judges
reviewed the law. In effect that seems to mean that the constitutional guarantees of tenure and irreducible salary apply only to the
judges of the highest court with jurisdiction to review the case, although the Constitution expressly states that they apply to "inferior" courts as well. However, this entire passage was dictum, since
the result in Crowell was to affirm the order setting aside the administrator's award, on the ground that the trial court had properly
held a trial de novo on the factual question whether a master-servant relationship existed between the parties.8 0 In reaching the
latter conclusion, moreover, the Court essentially demolished the
basis for its troublesome dictum that administrators could be entrusted in private cases with the final determination of facts: To
allow Congress to "substitute for constitutional courts, in which
the judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative
agency... for the final determination of the existence of the facts
upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend," wrote Chief Justice Hughes, "would be to sap the ju.. ..
"76

76. Id. at 50.
77. Id. at 51. As Justice Brandeis observed in dissent, this formulation itself
appeared to broaden the Bakelite category, for neither Murray nor Bakelite had
suggested that all Government business could be transacted outside the article III
courts. Id. at 87 n.23. Yet Crowell's obiter restatement was repeated in the context
of substituting administrators for civil juries in Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430
U.S. 442 (1977): "Our prior cases support administrative factflnding in only those
situations involving 'public rights,' e.g., where the Government is involved in its
sovereign capacity.... Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases as well as
a vast range of other cases as well are not at all implicated." Id. at 458. In terms of
the purposes underlying the constitutional provisions this distinction seems quite
backwards with respect both to independent judges and to the jury: the greatest
need to keep the power of decision out of the hands of ordinary government officials
arises in cases to which the Government itself is a party.
78. 285 U.S. at 51.
79. Id. at 49, 51-54.
80. Id. at 65.
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dicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to
establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our
system, whenever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently
they do depend, upon the facts. ...
"81
Even if the Crowell dictum is accepted as precedent, it does
not sustain the provision for nontenured bankruptcy judges. The
fundamental difference between the bankruptcy case and Crowell
is that in the Longshoremen's case Congress did not simply vest
jurisdiction in an ordinary court and deny its judges tenure; it created a separate administrative agency with distinctive nonjudicial
procedures and without the power to enforce its own decisions.
The administrator was to make his own investigation of the facts,
and at the hearing he was bound neither by traditional procedures
nor by the rules of evidence.8 2 Conversely, the agency in Crowell,
like other administrative bodies, had no power to enforce subpoenas, to execute its orders, or to enforce other legal process without
recourse to a constitutional court; it had no contempt powers; it
could not issue writs of habeas corpus. Significantly, in upholding
the statute against a due process objection,83 the Court stressed
Congress' purpose "to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact
which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by
an administrative agency specially assigned to that task."8 4 In
other words, the Crowell dictum allows Congress, under certain
circumstances, in response to the demonstrated inadequacy of judicial processes, to enlist the aid of nonjudicial agencies without
the power to enforce their own orders. It is not authority for allowing nontenured judges to exercise the jurisdiction vested by
statute in article III courts themselves.8 5
81. Id. at 56-57. In the obiter section of its opinion the Court had attempted to
justify leaving certain factual determinations to the administrator by analogy to the
functions of juries and special masters. Id. at 49, 51-54. In holding a de novo review
required on the issue of employment, however, the Court demonstrated that the
analogy was not persuasive: both juries and masters, unlike the administrator, acted under judicial supervision, and a master's report was "essentially advisory, a
distinction of controlling importance when questions of a fundamental character
are in issue." Id. at 61. The Court might have added that juries, unlike administrative agencies, were required by the seventh amendment and thus could hardly have
been held unconstitutional.
82. Id. at 43.
83. Id. at 45-48.
84. Id. at 46.
85. See Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New
Bankruptcy Courts Are Unconstitutional, 70 GEo. J. 297 (1981): "[Only a virtually willful inattention to detail could cause one to miss the difference between officers who are and officers who are not empowered to issue final judgments, to
enforce their own monetary awards, to conduct all manner of civil proceedings that
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Indeed, the bankruptcy provision runs squarely counter to the
flat statement of Justice Harlan in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok that a
litigant in an articleIII court has a right to be tried by an article III
judge.86 The petitioners in Glidden had been litigants in article III
cases in the federal courts, and their cases had been heard by
judges of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. They argued that their rights had been infringed because
these judges did not enjoy life tenure. The Court rejected the
claim on the merits because it concluded that the judges in question were protected by article III. But the Harlan opinion made
perfectly clear the result would have been otherwise had they not
been so protected: "Article III, § 1... is explicit and gives the petitioners a basis of complaint. ."...87 Thus while the Crowell dictum intimates that Congress may transfer even some private cases
to administrative agencies subject to judicial review of questions
of law, Glidden reaffirms the plain command of the Constitution
that the litigant in an article III court has a right to an article III
judge, and that means the bankruptcy provision is
unconstitutional.
Moreover, the special factors relied on in Crowell to support
federal district courts may conduct, including jury trials." Id. at 308-09. This distinction was also suggested by the 1977 decision in Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430
U.S. 442 (1977), where the Court, in holding the seventh amendment did not require
a jury in administrative proceedings to collect a money penalty, assumed that a jury
would be required if the same proceeding were conducted in a federal court, as an
earlier decision had indicated. Id. at 449 n.6, citing Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S.
103 (1909) (dictum). In Atlas, the Court stated: "[Elven if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication ... is assigned instead to
a federal court of law. . .," Congress is "not ... prevented from committing some
new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in the
relevant field." 430 U.S. at 455. Quoting a prior statement that "'the Seventh
Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication,"'
id. at 454, quoting Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974) (dictum), the
Court in Atlas, as in Crowell, stressed that Congress had rejected traditional judicial remedies as inadequate, and stated flatly that "the right to a jury trial turns not
solely on the nature of the issue to be resolved, but also on the forum in which it is
to be resolved," and concluded that "[t] he Seventh Amendment is no bar to the
creation of new rights or to their enforcement outside the regularcourts of law."
430 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added).
86. 370 U.S. at 533.
87. Id. Justice Harlan spoke for only three Justices in Glidden, but it seems
clear that the entire Court agreed with him on this point. The concurring Justices
also resolved on the merits the issue of the article III status of the Courts of Claims
and of Customs and Patent Appeals, which they would not have had to do if there
had been no right to an article III judge. Id. at 585-89 (Warren, C.J., Clark, J., concurring). The two dissenters, who with Harlan and those joining him made a majority, concluded that the assignment of those judges was unconstitutionalnecessarily implying that the litigants had a right to be tried by an article I judge.
Id. at 589-606 (Douglas, Black, JJ., dissenting).
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the creation of even an administrative agency are not present in
the bankruptcy case. Congress expressed no dissatisfaction with
the established practice of resolving bankruptcy matters by ordinary judicial processes; it did not confer nonjudicial authority on
the bankruptcy judges; it did not relax traditional adversary procedures or suspend the rules of evidence. The caseload problems
and the need for expedition and expertise, which the Government
stressed in its brief in Northern Pipeline, could have been satisfied
88
just as well by creating a specialized court under article rH.
X
In United States v. Raddatz89 in 1980 the Court did uphold a
provision of the Federal Magistrates Act authorizing the use of
nontenured personnel in an article III court itself.90 Yet there are
two critical distinctions between that case and the bankruptcy situation that deprive Raddatz of any governing force. First, the statute in Raddatz merely gave the judge himself discretion to refer
issues to a magistrate, 9 1 while the bankruptcy law of its own force
transfers jurisdiction to a bankruptcy judge. The constitutionality
of the Supreme Court's power to deny certiorari 92 is no precedent
for the power of Congress to deprive the Court of jurisdiction over
the same cases. Similarly, since the principal purpose of the tenure and salary clauses was to assure judicial independence from
the legislative and executive branches, giving a judge power to invoke the aid of another is not the same for constitutional purposes
as requiring someone else to decide the case.
The second difference between the bankruptcy case and Raddatz is equally compelling. The Magistrates Act expressly directed the district judge to "make a de novo determination" of any
decision "to which objection is made. '9 3 The Court emphasized
that under the Magistrates Act "the district court judge alone acts
as the ultimate decisionmaker" 94 and that "the entire process
takes place under the district court's total control and jurisdiction. '95 Only because the statute provided that the magistrate's
proposed findings and recommendations were to be subject to de
novo redetermination by the judge, 'ho... then exercise I s] the
88.
89.

See 102 S. Ct. at 2873 n.28.
447 U.S. 667, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980).

90. Id. at 683.
91. Id. at 669.
92. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257, 1258 (1976).
93. 447 U.S. at 673; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976).

94. 447 U.S. at 680.
95. Id. at 681.
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ultimate authority to issue an appropriate order, '96 did the
Supreme Court conclude that such a limited delegation did not violate article III. The Court added specifically that "[wle need not
decide whether, as suggested by the Government, Congress could
constitutionally have delegated the task of rendering a final decision on a suppression motion to a non-Art. III officer. '97 Thus the
powers upheld in Raddatz were, as the Court had said of masters
in Crowell v. Benson, "essentially advisory;" and Raddatz is no authority for the creation of nontenured bankruptcy judges whose
decisions are subject only to normal (and limited) appellate
98
review.
XI
The Government argued in Northern Pipeline that the 1978
bankruptcy judge provisions should be upheld because they were
not substantially different from the prior practice of bankruptcy
referees "that had operated for many years without constitutional
challenge." 99
The first answer to this contention is that the old referee system was never held to be constitutional. 10 0 The second is that the
system as it stood in 1978 was the result of gradual changes over
time: it did not represent long settled practice. The third is that
even in its final form the referee practice differed from the 1978
provisions in several constitutionally significant respects.
Under the 1938 statute the judge retained power to determine
whether or not to refer a case to a referee, for the statute authorized reference by the clerk "unless the judge or judges direct
otherwise."'' 1 Moreover, the act then provided, as it had since
1898, that a referee's actions were "subject always to a review by
the judge;' 0 2 and although a 1939 General Order adopted by the
Supreme Court provided in general that the judge "shall accept his
96. Id. at 682.
97. Id. at 681.
98. See also 102 S.Ct. at 2875-77.
99. Brief for Appellant at 41, Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
100. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), invoked by dissenting Justice White
in Northern Pipeline, 102 S.Ct. at 2886, did not address the question. As early as
1805 Chief Justice Marshall made clear that even jurisdictional issues could not be
taken as settled by decisions in cases in which they were not raised: "No question
was made, in that case, as to the jurisdiction. It passed sub silentio, and the court
does not consider itself as bound by that case." United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 159, 172 (1805).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 1031 (1938).
102. Id. at § 66.
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findings of fact unless clearly erroneous,"110 3 the same order gave
the judge authority both to provide "otherwise ... in the order of
10 4
reference" and to "receive further evidence" on his own.
While the Bankruptcy Rules adopted by the Court in 1973
made the reference automatic 0 5 and eliminated the judge's power
to take new evidence after receiving a referee's report, 0 6 they gave
the judge authority to "withdraw a case in whole or in part" after it
had been referred. 10 7 As in the case of the magistrates in Raddatz,
any limitation of the judge's authority to determine any issue in a
bankruptcy case was entirely voluntary on the part of the judge.
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, however, this authority was limited by Congress. Moreover, as illustrated by the Northern Pipeline case, the 1978 act dramatically extended the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy judges. The claim in question was an ordinary contract and tort claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate against a third
party; it could not have been tried in the bankruptcy proceeding
before 1978 without the parties' consent. 0 8 Any such claim could
be so tried under the 1978 statute. The enormous range of this new
authority eliminated any legitimate basis for contending that the
bankruptcy judges exercised only a narrow and specialized portion
of district court business. If the bankruptcy provision had been
sustained, it is difficult to see that there would have been any significant limit to Congress's power to destroy the independence of
federal judges.
103. Gen. Order in Bankr. no. 47, 305 U.S. 677, 702 (1939); and 102 S. Ct. at 2876
n.31.
104. Id.
105. FED. R. BANKR. P. 102(a).
106. Id. at 810.
107. Id. at 102(b).
108. See 102 S. Ct. at 2885 (White, J., dissenting). The government argued that
the removal of the consent requirements was irrelevant because "subject matter
jurisdiction could not have been waived by the parties." Brief for Appellant at 13,
Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). The
term "subject matter jurisdiction," which embraces a variety of disparate limitations, serves only to obscure the real issue. The reason certain subject matter limitations cannot be waived is that they serve interests the parties cannot be expected
to protect, such as noninterference with matters reserved to the state courts. Subject matter limitations designed for the protection of the parties, in contrast, can be
waived. In Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883), where the objection was made that
the suit had effectively been "brought against a State by citizens of another State,"
the Court upheld jurisdiction despite its assumption that the suit was forbidden by
the eleventh amendment: "The immunity from suit belonging to a State, which is
respected and protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial power
of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure ... " Id.
at 447. This analysis applies equally to the tenure and salary provisions of article
III, which, as the authorities quoted above demonstrate, was designed as a protection for the parties from the risk of legislative or executive pressure on judicial
decision.
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For all these reasons the earlier system of bankruptcy referees
was no precedent for sustaining the authority of the new bankruptcy judges. 10 9
XII
Speaking for four Justices in Northern Pipeline, Justice Brennan distinguished the precedents much as I have done, concluding
that "legislative courts"-those not satisfying article III-were permissible only in three distinct situations: in geographical areas
such as the Territories and the District of Columbia where the
Court had found ordinary separation-of-powers principles inapplicable; in historically separate military proceedings influenced by
the exception in the fifth amendment; and in cases involving "public rights" historically subject to nonjudicial determination, as in
Bakelite.110 To his treatment of Crowell and Raddatz I shall return
in a later section."'
Terming Justice Brennan's distinctions unsatisfactory, the dissenters argued that the precedents required article III to be read
"as expressing one value that must be balanced against competing
constitutional values and legislative responsibilities." 112 The availability of appellate review of a bankruptcy judge's decisions "provides a firm check on the ability of the political institutions of
government to ignore or transgress constitutional limits on their
own authority;" 1 3 there was no serious argument that the statute
"represents an attempt by the political branches of government to
aggrandize themselves at the expense of the third branch," since
"[b] ankruptcy matters are, for the most part, private adjudications
of little political significance;"" 4 and the enormous number of
bankruptcy cases was a strong justification for the creation of a
1 15
tribunal outside article lII.
If I were to agree with Justice White's criteria for evaluating
the constitutionality of nontenured arbiters, I would still reject his
conclusions respecting bankruptcy judges; any need for additional
or expert arbiters could as easily have been met without compromising values underlying article HI.116 But my more fundamental
109. 102 S. Ct. at 2876 n.31.
110. Id. at 2868-71.
111. See notes 116-26 and accompanying text infra.
112. 102 S. Ct. at 2893 (White, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2894.
114. Id. at 2895.
115. Id. at 2895-96.
116. See note 87 and accompanying text supra. Justice White argued to the contrary that "[t] he addition of several hundred specialists may substantially change,
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objection is to his reading of the precedents. The distinctions Justice Brennan and I have drawn are not our own invention: they are
in most cases those drawn by the Court itself in the very precedents Justice White invokes. Whether or not those distinctions
make sense as an original matter, it seems questionable to argue
that prior decisions require the abandonment of the very reasoning on which they were based.
XIII
The most difficult precedent for Justice Brennan, as for me,
was the workmen's-compensation case of Crowell v. Benson. 117 In
dealing with this precedent, Justice Brennan and I part company;
and in his treatment of Crowell I perceive the risk of further encroachments on the principles of article III.
First, Justice Brennan attempts to assimilate Crowell to Raddatz as a case in which the administrator acted not as an independent "legislative court" but as an "adjunct" to the district
court and subject to its control. Not only, as I have argued, was the
administrator in Crowell required to go to court to enforce his orders; while his orders "were to be set aside if 'not supported by the
evidence,' the judgments of the bankruptcy courts are apparently
subject to review only under the more deferential 'clearly errone'
ous' standard."1'
Unfortunately Justice Brennan's implication
that the district judge in Crowell was required to review the administrator's order de novo is refuted by the very passages in
Crowell that he was attempting to distinguish; the Court there
whether for good or bad, the character of the federal bench," 102 S. Ct. at 2895, but
he did not explain why that was relevant to the constitutional question. He added
that a possible future reduction in the number of bankruptcies might leave the
courts with "the prospect of large numbers of idle federal judges." Id. at 2896. A
similar argument was once used to explain why nontenured judges could hear
cases in the Territories, see Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 546-47, but it was abandoned when the territorial precedents were extended to the District of Columbia,
which is not transitory. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra. More fundamentally, the suggestion that the bankruptcy judges are "transitory" goes much too
far, for every grant of federal jurisdiction is subject to the contingency of later repeal. There have been repeated efforts to abolish the diversity jurisdiction, but that
does not mean Congress could have vested that jurisdiction in nontenured judges.
Indeed the repeal of the federal question jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act
of 1801 did render superfluous the services of sixteen new judges, but that did not
mean their jurisdiction could have been given to a legislative court. The framers
deliberately took the risk of a temporary surfeit of judges when they provided for
tenure while giving Congress authority to establish courts "from time to time." U.S.
CONsT. art. III, § 1. The risk of surplus judges is the price of judicial independence,
not an excuse for its destruction.
117. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See notes 74-87 and accompanying text supra.
118. 102 S. Ct. at 2879.
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said expressly that with the exception of two narrow categories of
"jurisdictional" facts, de novo review was not constitutionally required. 119 Possibly Justice Brennan's reformulation may be taken
to have modified the Crowell dictum, and for that I should be
grateful. I fear, however, that it may rather be disregarded as an
accidental mistake unnecessary to the result in Northern Pipeline,
for Justice Brennan had a second and more disturbing basis of
distinction.
Crowell, wrote Justice Brennan, sustained Congress's authority to create a nontenured "adjunct ... to aid in the adjudication of
congressionally created statutory rights"-not, as in the Northern
case, of "rights not created by Congress.' 20 Why this mattered
was suggested by the following quotation:
[W] hen Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has
the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it
may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that
right must do so before particularized tribunals created to
perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that
right. Such provisions do, in a sense, affect the exercise of
judicial power, but they are also incidental to Congress'
power to define the right it has created. No comparable
justification exists, however, when the121right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation.
If by this passage Justice Brennan meant to say that Congress
may establish nontenured trial courts for all congressionally created causes of action, he has interpreted Crowell v. Benson's dictum broadly indeed, and his "adjunct" category has taken away
most of what he had attempted to preserve in his narrow statement of the situations in which "legislative courts" are permitted.
As I have argued above, I do not think Crowell need be read to
have made such extreme inroads on article ]11.122 Moreover, Justice Brennan's distinction does not have the advantage of being derived from precedent; it is essentially new. He does point out that
Crowell held certain constitutional questions were required to be
reexamined by the court de novo, but he is forced to admit that
that holding "has been undermined by later cases."'123 More important, a special position for constitutional questions, however
difficult to square with article III, would not help Justice Brennan's
119.
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285 U.S. at 64-65. See also notes 74-78 and accompanying text supra.
102 S. Ct. at 2877.
Id. at 2878.
See notes 81-84 and accompanying text supra.
102 S. Ct. at 2877 & n.34, adding that in other areas later cases have continrequire de novo review of certain constitutional questions.
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conclusion in Northern Pipeline, where the issue was one of state
law. Nothing in Crowell even faintly suggests the improbable conclusion that the separation of powers doctrine requires greater judicial independence in dealing with questions of state rather than
124
of federal law.
Justice Brennan's argument is basically that the greater includes the less: Because Congress did not have to create a right of
action at all, it could entrust the adjudication of claims it did create
to anyone it pleased. This is an extension of the argument in Bakelite; that Congress may create legislative courts when it need not
create courts at all. 125 Because it is an extension, it is not compelled by Bakelite; and it is no more convincing than was the argument in Bakelite itself. The Constitution does not require
Congress to create any federal right of action; but it leaves no
doubt who is to decide "Cases ... arising under ... the Laws of
the United States .... "126 In deciding an analogous question
under the due process clause, Justice Brennan was with the majority in reaching a conclusion inconsistent with this dictum in Northern Pipeline: While a state is free to determine whether or not to
create a property interest, once it has done so, the Constitution
prescribes that that interest may not be taken away without due
process of law. 127
XIV
Since Northern's claim against Marathon was a state-created
one, and the district court's control over the proceeding was narrowly limited, Justice Brennan concluded that the bankruptcy
judge could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over it; and
because he was unable to conclude that Congress would have
passed the other jurisdictional provisions if it had known of this
conclusion, he decided that the entire provision for bankruptcy
judges must fall.128 He did not, however, say that Congress was
without power to correct the situation by simply excising from the
bankruptcy judges' authority the adjudication of claims arising
under state law. His stress on the fact that Crowell involved a federal claim suggests that such a solution might pass muster, as does
the concession that "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations
...may well be a 'public right.' "129 Moreover, Justices Rehnquist
124. See 102 S. Ct. at 2885 (White, J., dissenting).
125. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
126. U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 2.
127. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-55 (1974).
128. 102 S. Ct. at 2878-80 & n.40.
129. Id. at 2871.
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and O'Connor wrote separately to stress that there was no occasion to decide anything more than the unconstitutionality of hav1 30
ing the bankruptcy judge determine Northern's state-law claim.
Unfortunately, the concurring Justices did not say whether they
agreed with Justice Brennan's reasons for holding that article In
forbade the bankruptcy judge to decide this claim; they said only
that "[nione of the cases has gone so far . . ."131 Chief Justice
Burger, who joined Justice White's dissent, added that he thought
the Court had left it open to Congress to solve the problem "simply
by providing that ancillary common-law actions, such as the one
involved in this case, be routed to the United States district court
..

.. "t

132

Justice Brennan's discussion of the scope of judicial re-

view suggests that the Chief Justice may have overstated his case.
Yet in any event, the unfortunate distinction of Crowell and the
narrow concurrence of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor indicate
that the Court may yet be willing to allow at least some extension
of the powers of nontenured arbiters beyond those previously
upheld.
CONCLUSION
In short, although I welcome the Northern Pipeline decision as
calling a long overdue halt to the erosion of judicial independence,
it is a far cry from the ringing endorsement of article III that I had
hoped for. Indeed Justice Brennan's near concession that article
III trial courts are not needed for any cases arising under federal
statutes, while dictum, may foreshadow a major step in the wrong
direction.
I would have stopped the decline of the tenure and salary requirements more decisively. Even if it was "too late" to overrule
the unfortunate precedents, it was not necessary to extend them.
There is still hope in Justice Brennan's effort to demonstrate that
Crowell was after all a case subject to intensive judicial review,
and in the fact that two members of the majority declined to express an opinion on cases not before them.
At the very least, Northern Pipeline is a refreshing reminder
that the tenure and salary requirements cannot always be evaded
by congressional whim. Not only do I believe that all constitutional provisions should be respected until altered by the prescribed process of amendment, I view the tenure and salary
provisions as among those most central to the maintenance of our
130. Id. at 2880-82.
131. Id. at 2881.
132. Id. at 2882.
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liberty. As William Rawle wrote in one of our earliest commentaries on the Constitution, if the people "value and wish to preserve
their Constitution, they ought never to surrender the indepen133
dence of their judges."

133.

W.

RAWLE,

A VIEW

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

281 (2d ed. 1829).
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